The indifference of Moscow towards the massacres was expressed clearly by
giving no orders to Azerbaijani government and Soviet troops that were
located precisely on the boarder of Armenia and Azerbaijan to stop the
violence. Is it a repetition of what Turkish government did against
Armenians who were a subject of Ottoman Empire in 1915? There was no
explicit approval from the Kremlin on measures Azerbaijanis took against
Armenian population, yet there was no immediate response to it either. The
official record displayed 32 deaths for the three days of the outrage;
however, during the entire year of 1988, the case didn’t take place in
court. As the memories of the genocide became vivid the Azerbaijani
authorities played with this psychological trauma caused many years ago and
passed into a new stage of fear by letting Armenians know they had gone too
far and, thus jeopardizing those who reside in territories governed by
Azerbaijan.[22]
By November and then aggravating in December 1988, pogroms started to
spread in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. The attitude towards Armenian
population rapidly began to decline after Sumgait pogroms with only
periodic help from the Soviet Army. Breaks out of hostility and hatred
were directed even at religious objects. The Armenian Cathedral in Baku
was burned. On December 5, 1989, crowds of Azeris started threatening
Armenian population. Gangs of young Azerbaijanis (age range was 16-30),
carrying the Turkish flag stopped buses, checked ID’s of passengers and
after tracking down an Armenian they would pull a person out of a bus and
beat him/her (!) up, regardless of age of the victim. Such violence and
cruelty are not easy to understand, for Armenians and Azerbaijanis were
living in peace and harmony prior to the events. The perpetrators
apparently were given the implicit approval from the Azerbaijani government
in regards to Armenians. Azereis were granted with right to do whatever
they wanted with Armenian population. In stores if a sales person
suspected in a customer an Armenian, a clerk would refuse to sell bread to
that person. And the more harming assaults are not even to mention. They
raped young pregnant women and older women, torturing and outraging them;
Azeris poured their victims with gasoline and burned them. The entire city
seemed infected by hysteria. On the day of the earthquake in Armenia
Azerbaijanis were jumping up and down in celebration of the catastrophe,
rejoicing over sufferings of other humans. Only on January 19, 1990, a
state of emergency was declared and 20 000 Soviet troops were dispatched to
put down the riots again the Armenian population of Azerbaijan.[23]
Many Armenians made a direct analogy between events in Azerbaijan and
1915 in Turkey. Armenians living in Baku and Sumgait were assimilated with
the native population. Intermarriages were popular and well accepted by
people. Most Armenians living in Azerbaijan sent their children to Russian
schools, and therefore, the primarily spoken language was Russian even at
homes. Hence, the history of Armenia was more known from books and family
memories rather than through official teaching. Therefore, how can be
explained hasty leaving by 350 000 Armenians their homes, possessions and
lifetime memories except that they feared the old scenario to be played
again. The pogroms left houses in Armenian quarters of Baku ravaged,
however, the massacres of 31 people in Sumgait and 160 in Baku (according
to official records, though the number might be underestimated) is a
relatively small number. Hence, the explanation for such massive reaction
of Armenians can be found in a historical memory that led to conviction
that Armenians refused to be scapegoats again. There is a palpable
parallel between sociopolitical status of Armenians in Azerbaijan and
Armenian in Turkey on the eve of slaughtering. In both cases Armenians
were a prosperous element of the society they lived in, however, they were
in minority, thus obviously suitable for any kind of persecution.
Ironically, but pogroms and killings in Sumgait and Baku as well as the
compulsory migration of Armenians to Armenia and Russia might have
prevented a second cycle of genocide against Armenian population.[24]
Some aspects in analogy between 1915 and 1988-90 don’t fit the large
scaled picture, compiled of both tragic periods of the Armenian history.
However, some parallels are obvious. For example, deprivation of basic
essentials and lack of even first necessities present during the blockade
against the Republic of Armenia and while deportation of Armenians was
carried out in Ottoman Empire. Also, the sadistic tortures against
Armenian population took place in both Sumgait-Baku massacres and the
genocide. Moreover, there is an ideology and attitude of perpetrators in
both cases played an important role. There were cases in Turkey where
officials refused to follow the orders of the central government and to
carry out execution of innocent people and many Turks hid their Armenian
neighbors in their houses, thus saving their lives. The same way some
Azerbaijanis treated Armenians, as interviews with survivors testify.
However, the overwhelming majority of Azerbaijanis and Turks celebrated
festively deaths of Armenians, and that was common in both cases.
Although, the pogroms in Sumgait and Baku resemble more the pogroms
of the late nineteenth century rather than the genocide of 19154, yet the
methodology and ultimate purpose were figuring as major aspects of
projecting the genocide of 1915 to massacres in 1988-90. The political
environment was also an important element of the turmoil, for if Armenians
didn’t side with Russians in the early twentieth century and if Armenians
didn’t claim reunification with Karabakh in the late nineteenth century,
all of the bloodshed would have not, perhaps, take place at all. [25]
The Karabakh crisis reveal much about the transgenerational
psychological impact of genocide. In the best of circumstances, the trauma
persists for decades, even generations and manifests itself in a very
unexpected way. The trauma is clearly compounded when the perpetrators are
left unpunished, when there are no acts of contrition or indemnification,
and when external society or governments find it inexpedient to join in
remembrance. Historical memory forcefully shapes contemporary outlook. The
past is present[26].
-----------------------
[1] Alfred Schultz, “The Phenomenology of the Social World” (Evanston,
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967)
[2] Donald E. Miller ,“The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting events
in the Republic of Armenia,”in Richard G. Hovanessian (ed.) “Remembrance
and Denial” (Detroit, Michigan, Wayne State University Press, 1998) p.187
[3] Frank Chalk “Redefining Genocide,” ed. George J. Andreopulos Genocide:
Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1994) pp. 48-50.
[4] Richard G Hovanessian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide”
ed. George J. Andreopulos Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) pp.111-112
[5] Donald Miller “The role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events in
the republic of Armenia,” ed. Richard G. Hovanessian Remembrance and Denial
(Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1998) p. 197
[6] R. G. Hovanissian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide,” ed.
G.J. Andreopulus Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press, 1994) pp.117-121
[7] Gerald J. Libardian “The Ultimate Repression: The Genocide of the
Armenians, 1915-1917” in I. Walliman and M. Dobkowski (ed.) Genocide and
the Modern Age (Westport, Connecticut, Grrenwood Press, 1987) p. 204
[8] Ibid., p. 205
[9] Ibid., pp. 204-206
[10] Richard G. Hovanissian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian
Genocide,” G.J. Andreopulus (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical
Dimensions” (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press, 1944) p. 115
[11] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit, Wayne
State University Press, 1995) p. 82
[12] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake, (Michigan,
Wayne State University Press, 1995) p.82
[13] Alexander Benigsen “The Caucasian Fuse”, Arabies, nos. 19-20
(July/August 1988)
[14] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake, (Michigan,
Wayne State University Press, 1995) pp. 82-83
[15] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit, Wayne
State University Press) p.83
[16] Uwe Halbach “Anatomy of an Escalation: The Nationality Question”,
Federal Institute for Soviet and International Studies (ed.) The Soviet
Union 1988-1989, Perestroika in Crisis? (San Francisco, Westview Press,
1990) p.73
[17] Pr, 8 February 1986
[18] Uwe Halbach “Anatomy of Escalation: The Nationality Question”, Federal
Institute for Soviet and International Studies (ed.) The Soviet Union 1988-
1989, Perstroika in Crisis? (San Francisco, Westview Press, 1990) p. 74
[19] Pierre Verluisse Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit,
Wayne State University, 1995) p. 86
[20] Donald E. Miller “The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events
in the Republic of Armenia” Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.) Remembrance and
Denial (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1998) p. 191
[21] Richard G. Hovannisian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian
Genocide”, G. Andreopoulos (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical
Dimensions (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,1994) p.116
[22] Pierre Verluise Armenia in Crisis, The 1988 Earthquake (Detroit, Wayne
State University Press, 1995), p. 89
[23] Donald E. Miller “The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events
in the Republic of Armenia”, Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.) Remembrance and
Denial: The Case of Armenian Genocide (Detroit, Wayne State University
Press, 1998) pp. 192-195
[24] Ibid., pp. 196-197
[25] Ibid., pp. 197-199
[26] Richard G. Hovannisian “Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian
Genocide”, George J. Andreopoulos (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical
Dimensions (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press,1994) p.117
